Summer School on Matching Problems, Markets, and Mechanisms:

the first summer school of the COST Action on Computational Social Choice

Home

Dates: 24-28 June 2013

Organisers: Péter Biró, Bettina Klaus, Flip Klijn

An event of the IC1205 COST Action on Computational Social Choice

Organised locally by

Game Theory Research Group of CERS-HAS, supported by the Momentum Program of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
III. scientific section of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Mathematics)
IX. scientific section of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Economics and Law)

Further sponsors

Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Conference Grant

Short overview of the subject

The fourth Working Group of the IC1205 COST Action addresses the design and analysis of matching mechanisms. Examples for matching problems include internship allocation, public school choice, higher education admissions, or kidney exchanges (between patients, each associated with an incompatible donor that might be compatible with some other patient). Matching market design is an interdisciplinary research area of Economics, Game Theory, and Computer Science. Based on the particular characteristics of the matching markets at hand, a first task is to determine the desirable properties that a satisfactory algorithm should satisfy. These considerations may include criteria of efficiency, fairness, and non-manipulability and the importance and formulation of each criterion might differ depending on the socio-economic and cultural context. A second task is to establish the existence of a (class of) algorithm(s) that satisfy the requirements (i.e., prove the compatibility of the requirements), and determine their computational complexity. Additional techniques to design a matching algorithm for specific markets are experiments and simulations.

Alvin E. Roth and Lloyd S. Shapley have received the 2012 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design.

Poster session

Participants are welcome to present their matching related research on posters during the welcome reception. We will get all posters printed in color A1 portrait format, if sent by 19 June (preferably as a one-page pdf file, like this). There will also be an award for the best poster.

Conctact address

matching.school@krtk.mta.hu