

# Two applications of axiomatic ranking

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- Introduction
- Derivation of revealed preferences
- Connection to paired comparisons-based ranking
- Axioms

## 3 Summary

# Part I: Ranking in Swiss-system chess team tournaments

# Swiss system chess team tournaments

## Characteristics

- ▶ Too many players to play a round-robin tournament ( $n$  is too large)
- ▶ A predetermined number of rounds ( $c \ll n - 1$ ) is organized
- ▶ Colour allocation does not count, no 'home advantage' (see later)

## How to rank the teams on the basis of known results?

- ▶ Pairing algorithm is exogenous: matches between 'similar' teams
- ▶ Teams have different schedules

## Measures of performance

- ▶ All matches are played on  $2b$  boards:  $b$  players play with white and the other  $b$  players play with black in each team
- ▶ Board points: sum of points on the boards (win: 1, draw: 0.5, loss: 0)
- ▶ Match points: match outcome is decided by board points scored  
win: at least  $b + 0.5$  board points (win: 2, draw: 1, loss: 0)

## Example: a match between two teams

Board number	Armenia	Hungary	Result
1	□ ARONIAN, Levon	■ BALOGH, Csaba	0.5 : 0.5
2	■ MOVSESIAN, Sergei	□ ALMASI, Zoltan	1 : 0
3	□ AKOPIAN, Vladimir	■ POLGAR, Judit	0.5 : 0.5
4	■ SARGISSIAN, Gabriel	□ BANUSZ, Tamas	0.5 : 0.5
Board points	2.5	1.5	
Match points	2	0	

# Ranking in chess team tournaments

## Official rankings

- ▶ Lexicographic order based on board or match points
- ▶ Board and match points do not depend on the strength of opponents
- ▶ Various tie-breaking rules: final result should be a strict total order

## Notations

- ▶ **bp** is the vector of board points
- ▶ **mp** is the vector of match points

## Board points ranking

The ranking derived from **bp**:  $i \succeq j \iff bp_i \geq bp_j$ .

## Match points ranking

The ranking derived from **mp**:  $i \succeq j \iff mp_i \geq mp_j$ .

# Match results, European Championship (EC) 2013

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	Match points		
1																																								14	
2																																									13
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36																																									4
37																																									4
38																																									0

# Match results, EC 2013 (zoomed)

Rank	Team	1	2	3	4	5	...	Match points
1	Azerbaijan		=		=	=	...	14
2	France	=		X	=	=	...	13
3	Russia		✓		X		...	13
4	Armenia	=	=	✓		✓	...	13
5	Hungary	=	=		X		...	12



# The general mathematical model

## Ranking problem $(N, R, M)$

- ▶ Set of alternatives:  $N = \{X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n\}$
- ▶ Matches matrix  $M$ : symmetric,  $m_{ii} = 0$  for all  $X_i$   
 $m_{ij} = m_{ji} \in \mathbb{N}$  is the number of comparisons between  $X_i$  and  $X_j$
- ▶ Results matrix  $R$ : skew-symmetric,  $r_{ii} = 0$  for all  $X_i$   
 $r_{ji} = -r_{ij}$  and  $r_{ij} \in [-m_{ij}, m_{ij}]$

## Ranking by scoring

- ▶  $\mathcal{R}^n$  is the set of ranking problems  $(N, R, M)$  such that  $|N| = n$
- ▶ Scoring procedure  $f : \mathcal{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$
- ▶ Ranking:  $X_i$  is ranked weakly above  $X_j \iff f_i(N, R, M) \geq f_j(N, R, M)$

## Round-robin ranking problem

- ▶ Ranking problem  $(N, R, M)$  is *round-robin* if  $m_{ij} = m$  for all  $X_i, X_j \in N$
- ▶  $\mathcal{R}_R^n$  is the set of round-robin ranking problems such that  $|N| = n$

# Some scoring procedures

## Notations

- ▶  $\mathbf{e} \in \mathbb{R}^n$  denotes the unit column vector:  $e_i = 1$  for all  $i = 1, 2, \dots, n$
- ▶  $L \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$  is the Laplacian matrix of the comparison graph:  
 $\ell_{ii} = \sum_{X_j \in N} m_{ij}$  and  $\ell_{ij} = -m_{ij}$  for all  $X_i, X_j \in N$
- ▶  $m = \max_{X_i, X_j \in N} m_{ij}$  is the maximal number of comparisons

## Row sum ranking

- ▶  $\mathbf{s}(N, R, M) = R\mathbf{e}$ ,  $s_i = \sum_{j \in N} r_{ij}$  for all  $X_i \in N$

## Least squares ranking

- ▶ The solution  $\mathbf{q}$  of  $L\mathbf{q} = \mathbf{s}$  and  $\mathbf{e}^\top \mathbf{q} = 0$

## Generalized row sum ranking

- ▶ The unique solution of  $(I + \varepsilon L)\mathbf{x}(\varepsilon) = (1 + \varepsilon mn)\mathbf{s}$ ,  $\varepsilon > 0$  is a parameter
- ▶  $\lim_{\varepsilon \rightarrow 0} \mathbf{x}(\varepsilon) = \mathbf{s}$  and  $\lim_{\varepsilon \rightarrow \infty} \mathbf{x}(\varepsilon) = mn\mathbf{q}$

# Modelling the tournament

## Swiss-system chess team tournament as a ranking problem

- ▶  $N$  consists of the teams of the competition
- ▶ Matches matrix  $M$ :  $m_{ij} = 1$  if teams  $X_i$  and  $X_j$  have played against each other;  $m_{ij} = 0$  otherwise
- ▶  $r_{ij}$  depends on the match result (symmetric, draw: 0)

## Results matrices

- ▶ *Board points based results matrix*  $R^{BP}$ :  $r_{ij}^{BP} = (BP_{ij} - b)/b \in [-1, 1]$
- ▶ *Match points based results matrix*  $R^{MP}$ :  $r_{ij}^{MP} = MP_{ij} - 1 \in [-1, 1]$

## Lemma

Row sum ranking is equivalent to the official ranking without tie-breaking:

- ▶  $s_i(R^{BP}) \geq s_j(R^{BP}) \iff bp_i \geq bp_j$
- ▶  $s_i(R^{MP}) \geq s_j(R^{MP}) \iff mp_i \geq mp_j$

# Theoretical properties I.

## Axiom I: Score consistency

Scoring procedure  $f : \mathcal{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$  is called *score consistent* if  $f_i(N, R, M) \geq f_j(N, R, M) \iff s_i(N, R, M) \geq s_j(N, R, M)$  for all  $X_i, X_j \in N$  and round-robin ranking problem  $(N, R, M) \in \mathcal{R}^n$ .

## Lemma

Row sum, generalized row sum and least squares methods are score consistent.

## Corollary

Generalized row sum and least squares methods are equivalent to the official ranking without tie-breaking in round-robin tournaments:

- ▶  $x_i(\varepsilon)(R^{BP}) \geq x_j(\varepsilon)(R^{BP}) \iff q_i(R^{BP}) \geq q_j(R^{BP}) \iff bp_i \geq bp_j$
- ▶  $x_i(\varepsilon)(R^{MP}) \geq x_j(\varepsilon)(R^{MP}) \iff q_i(R^{MP}) \geq q_j(R^{MP}) \iff mp_i \geq mp_j$

## Theoretical properties II.

### Axiom II: Scale invariance

Let  $(N, R, M), (N, kR, M) \in \mathcal{R}^n$  be two ranking problems such that  $0 < k \leq \min_{X_i, X_j \in N} m_{ij} / |r_{ij}|$ . Scoring procedure  $f : \mathcal{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$  is called *scale invariant* if  $f_i(N, R, M) \geq f_j(N, R, M) \iff f_i(N, kR, M) \geq f_j(N, kR, M)$  for all  $X_i, X_j \in N$ .

### Lemma

Row sum, generalized row sum and least squares methods are scale invariant.

### Corollary

Let  $(N, R, M) \in \mathcal{R}^n$  be a ranking problem, and  $k \in (0, 1]$ . Row sum, generalized row sum and least squares methods give the same ranking if they are applied on  $R^{BP}$  and  $kR^{BP}$  as well as on  $R^{MP}$  and  $kR^{MP}$ .

# Theoretical properties III.

## Notations

- 1 The *opponent set* of object  $X_i$  is  $O_i = \{X_j : m_{ij} = 1\}$
- 2 Let  $X_i, X_j \in N$  be two different objects and  $g : O_i \leftrightarrow O_j$  be a one-to-one correspondence. Then  $g$  is given by  $X_{g(k)} = g(X_k)$ .

## Axiom III: Homogeneous treatment of opponents

Let  $X_i, X_j \in N$  be two objects and  $f : \mathcal{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$  be a scoring procedure such that there exists a one-to-one mapping  $g$  from  $O_i$  onto  $O_j$ , where  $f_k(N, R, M) = f_{g(k)}(N, R, M)$ .  $f$  satisfies *homogeneous treatment of opponents* if  $f_i(N, R, M) \geq f_j(N, R, M) \iff s_i(N, R, M) \geq s_j(N, R, M)$ .

## Lemma

Generalized row sum and least squares methods satisfy homogeneous treatment of opponents.

# Message of the axioms

## Score consistency

Generalized row sum and least squares ranking methods are equivalent to the official ranking without special tie-breaking rules if the tournament is round-robin (i.e. there are no constraints on the number of matches played).

## Scale invariance

Generalized row sum and least squares ranking methods give a unique ranking on the basis of match points if wins are more valuable (have an arbitrary value in  $(0, 1]$ ) than losses and draws correspond to an indifference relation.

## Homogeneous treatment of opponents

The relative ranking of two teams depends only on their board/match points if they have played against opponents with the same strength.

## Remark

Generalized row sum and least squares are iterative methods, they take the performance of opponents, opponents of opponents etc. into account.

# Illustration: chess team European championships

## Tournaments analysed

- 1 18th European Chess Team Championship Open section (EC 2011)  
3-11 November 2011, Porto Carras, Greece
- 2 19th European Chess Team Championship Open section (EC 2013)  
7-18 November 2013, Warsaw, Poland

## Implementation

- ▶ Both tournaments: 38 participants, 9 rounds
- ▶ 171 matches are played from the possible  $38 \times 37 / 2 = 703$  ( $\approx 25\%$ )
- ▶ Official ranking
- ▶ Least squares ranking(s)

## Favourable results

- ▶ Comparison to the official ranking: more robust (between subsequent rounds), somewhat better in-sample fit, identical out-of-sample fit



Team	Official rank (0)	1	2	3	4	5	6	9	12	Cumulated change	Least squares rank ( $\infty$ )
Azerbaijan	1	-	↓	-	-	-	-	-	-	↓	2
France	2	-	↑	-	-	-	-	-	-	↑	1
Russia	3	↓	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	↓	4
Armenia	4	↑	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	↑	3
Hungary	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
Georgia	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6
Greece	7	-	-	-	-	-	↓	-	-	↓	8
Czech Rep.	8	↓	↓	-	-	-	-	-	-	↓↓	10
Ukraine	9	↑	-	-	-	-	↑	-	-	↑↑	7
England	10	-	↑	-	-	-	-	-	-	↑	9
Netherlands	11	↓ (6)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	↓ (6)	17
Italy	12	↑	-	-	-	↓	-	-	-	-	12
Serbia	13	↓↓↓	↓↓	-	-	↓	-	-	-	↓ (6)	19
Romania	14	↓ (4)	↑↑	-	↑	-	-	-	-	↓	15
Belarus	15	↑↑↑	-	-	-	↑	-	-	-	↑ (4)	11
Poland	16	↑↑↑	-	-	-	↓	-	-	-	↑↑	14
Croatia	17	↑↑	-	-	↓	-	-	-	-	↑	16
Montenegro	18	↓	-	↓	-	-	-	-	↓	↓↓↓	21
Spain	19	↓↓	-	-	-	-	↓	-	-	↓↓↓	22
Germany	20	-	-	↑	-	↑	-	-	-	↑↑	18
Slovenia	21	↑ (7)	-	-	-	↑	-	-	-	↑ (8)	13
Poland Futures	22	↓↓	-	↓	-	↓	-	-	-	↓ (4)	26
Lithuania	23	↓↓	↓ (4)	-	-	-	↓	-	-	↓ (7)	30
Turkey	24	↑↑	-	-	-	-	↑	-	↑	↑ (4)	20
Bulgaria	25	↑↑	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	↑↑	23
Sweden	26	↓	-	↓	-	-	-	-	-	↓↓	28
Denmark	27	↓↓↓	↓	-	-	-	-	↓	-	↓ (5)	32
Israel	28	↑↑	↑	↑	-	-	-	-	-	↑ (4)	24
Iceland	29	↓↓↓	-	-	-	-	-	↑	-	↓↓	31
Austria	30	↑↑	↑↑	-	-	↑	-	-	-	↑ (5)	25
Poland Goldies	31	-	↑	-	-	-	↑	-	-	↑↑	29
Switzerland	32	↑↑↑	↑	↑	-	-	-	-	-	↑ (5)	27
Belgium	33	-	-	↓	-	-	-	-	-	↓	34
Finland	34	-	-	↑	-	-	-	-	-	↑	33
Norway	35	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	35
Scotland	36	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	36
FYR Macedonia	37	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	37
Wales	38	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	38

Part II:  
University rankings on the basis of  
applicants' preferences

# Hungarian higher education admission scheme

## Main features

- ▶ Centralized system
- ▶ Students give an application for programmes
- ▶ Students have a (possibly different) score for each programme
- ▶ Each programme has a score limit determined by an algorithm
- ▶ Matching: a student *must* accept the first programme where his/her score is not lower than the limit

## What is an application?

- ▶ It contains at most 5 programmes in a strict order
- ▶ State-funded and fee-paying form of two otherwise identical programmes count as one
- ▶ **Example:** 1st place – BA in International Business at Corvinus University of Budapest, Corvinus Business School (state-funded)

# Preferences from applications I.

Preferences can be derived not only among programmes, but arbitrary objects (universities, *faculties*, courses etc.)

## Assumptions

- 1 A higher ranked object is *preferred* to any lower ranked object
- 2 *No information* on preferences between two unranked objects
- 3 *No information* on preferences between a ranked object and an unranked object (Note: the length of the list is restricted)
- 4 If an object appears more than once in an application, only its best position counts: one student may have only one preference concerning a pair of objects

## Preferences from applications II.

### Original application

Rank	Faculty
1	SEAOK
2	DEFOK
3	SZTEAOK
4	SEAOK
5	DEAOK
6	SZTEAOK

### Reduced application

Rank	Faculty
1	SEAOK
2	DEFOK
3	SZTEAOK
4	—
5	DEAOK
6	—

### Revealed preferences

- ▶ SEAOK  $\succ$  DEFOK
- ▶ SEAOK  $\succ$  SZTEAOK
- ▶ SEAOK  $\succ$  DEAOK
- ▶ DEFOK  $\succ$  SZTEAOK
- ▶ DEFOK  $\succ$  DEAOK
- ▶ SZTEAOK  $\succ$  DEAOK

# Example: the aggregated paired comparisons matrix of Dentistry and Medical faculties in 2013


Faculty	Abbreviation	DA	DF	PA	PF	SA	SF	SZA	SZF	Total
DEAOK	DA	0	53	254	13	112	21	279	18	<b>750</b>
DEFOK	DF	99	0	24	60	16	24	25	53	<b>301</b>
PTEAOK	PA	271	18	0	39	110	24	285	19	<b>766</b>
PTEFOK	PF	28	59	92	0	15	24	27	53	<b>298</b>
SEAOK	SA	560	41	628	45	0	99	734	63	<b>2170</b>
SEFOK	SF	51	155	78	145	129	0	54	173	<b>785</b>
SZTEAOK	SZA	467	25	474	27	92	18	0	40	<b>1143</b>
SZTEFOK	SZF	33	109	45	100	14	22	92	0	<b>415</b>
Total		1509	460	1595	429	488	232	1496	419	<b>6628</b>

## The mathematical model

- ▶ Aggregated paired comparisons matrix  $T$ :  $t_{ij}$  is the number of students preferring object  $X_i$  to object  $X_j$
- ▶ Matches matrix  $M$ :  $m_{ij} = t_{ij} + t_{ji} \in \mathbb{N}$  (symmetric)
- ▶ Results matrix  $R$ :  $r_{ij} = t_{ij} - t_{ji} \in [-m_{ij}, m_{ij}]$  (skew-symmetric)

# Graphical representation I.


First student	
1st place	A
2nd place	B
3rd place	C



## Graphical representation II.

First student	
1st place	A
2nd place	B
3rd place	C

Second student	
1st place	C
2nd place	A





# Ranking methods

Nodes of a weighted, directed graph should be ranked.

**Row sum:**  $s(N, R, M)$

The difference of favourable and unfavourable preferences

**Ratio:**  $\sum_j t_{ij} / \sum_j t_{ji}$

The ratio of favourable and unfavourable preferences

**Generalized row sum:**  $x(\varepsilon)(N, R, M)$

**Least squares:**  $q(N, R, M)$


Solution of a system of linear equations, the quality of compared objects is taken into account

# Theoretical properties I.

## Axiom I: Independence of irrelevant matches (IIM)

Let  $(N, T), (N, T') \in \mathcal{R}^n$  be two ranking problems and  $X_k, X_\ell \in N$  be two different objects such that  $(N, T)$  and  $(N, T')$  are identical but  $t'_{k\ell} \neq t_{k\ell}$ . Scoring procedure  $f : \mathcal{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$  is called *independent of irrelevant matches* if  $f_i(N, T) \geq f_j(N, T) \Rightarrow f_i(N, T') \geq f_j(N, T')$  for all  $X_i, X_j \in N$ .

### The meaning of IIM




IIM implies  $[A \geq B \text{ in the first example}] \iff [A \geq B \text{ in the second example}]$

## Theoretical properties II.

### Axiom II: Size invariance (*SI*)

Let  $(N, T) \in \mathcal{R}^n$  be a ranking problem and  $X_i, X_j \in N$  be two different objects such that  $t_{jk} = \kappa t_{ik}$ ,  $\kappa \in \mathbb{Z}^+$  for all  $X_k \in N$ . Scoring procedure  $f : \mathcal{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$  is called *size invariant* if  $f_i(N, T) = f_j(N, T)$ .

### The meaning of *SI*




Size invariance implies  $A \sim B$

# Theoretical properties III.

## Axiom III: Critical result preservation (CRP)

Let  $(N, R, M) \in \mathcal{R}^n$  be a ranking problem and  $X_i, X_j \in N$  be two different objects such that  $m_{ik} = 0$  for all  $X_k \in N$ . Scoring procedure  $f : \mathcal{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$  satisfies *critical result preservation* if  $f_i(N, R, M) \geq f_j(N, R, M) \iff a_{ij} \geq 0$ .

### The meaning of CRP



Critical result preservation implies  $A > B$  in the first and  $A \sim B$  in the second case

# Axiomatic comparison of ranking methods

	$s(N, R, M)$	Ratio	$x(\varepsilon)(N, R, M)$	$q(N, R, M)$
<i>IIM</i>	✓	✓	✗	✗
<i>SI</i>	✗	✓	✗	✓
<i>CRP</i>	✗	✗	✗	✓

# Conclusions

## Key points

- ▶ Ranking on the basis of paired comparisons between objects
- ▶ Two potential fields of applications
- ▶ Mathematical expression of reasonable requirements in both cases

## Future research directions

- ▶ Refinement of the axiomatic approach: possibility/impossibility theorems, characterizations
- ▶ Further integration of axioms and applications

**Thank you for  
your attention!**